CRYPTO_LOCK(3MONOCYPHER)

CRYPTO_LOCK(3MONOCYPHER) | 3MONOCYPHER | CRYPTO_LOCK(3MONOCYPHER)

# NAME

`crypto_aead_lock`, `crypto_aead_unlock`, `crypto_aead_init_x`, `crypto_aead_init_djb`, `crypto_aead_init_ietf`, `crypto_aead_write`, `crypto_aead_read` — authenticated encryption with additional data

# SYNOPSIS

`#include <monocypher.h>`

void
`crypto_aead_lock`(uint8_t *cipher_text, uint8_t mac[16], const uint8_t key[32], const uint8_t nonce[24], const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_size, const uint8_t *plain_text, size_t text_size);

int
`crypto_aead_unlock`(uint8_t *plain_text, const uint8_t mac[16], const uint8_t key[32], const uint8_t nonce[24], const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_size, const uint8_t *cipher_text, size_t text_size);

void
`crypto_aead_init_x`(crypto_aead_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t key[32], const uint8_t nonce[24]);

void
`crypto_aead_init_djb`(crypto_aead_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t key[32], const uint8_t nonce[8]);

void
`crypto_aead_init_ietf`(crypto_aead_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t key[32], const uint8_t nonce[12]);

void
`crypto_aead_write`(crypto_aead_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *cipher_text, uint8_t mac[16], const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_size, const uint8_t *plain_text, size_t text_size);

int
`crypto_aead_read`(crypto_aead_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *plain_text, const uint8_t mac[16], const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_size, const uint8_t *cipher_text, size_t text_size);

# DESCRIPTION

`crypto_aead_lock`() encrypts and authenticates a plaintext. It can be decrypted by `crypto_aead_unlock`(). The arguments are:

key
  A 32-byte session key shared between the sender and the recipient. It must be secret and random. Different methods can be used to produce and exchange this key, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange, password-based key derivation (the password must be communicated on a secure channel), or even meeting physically. See crypto_x25519(3monocypher) for a building block for a key exchange protocol and crypto_argon2(3monocypher) for password-based key derivation.
nonce
  A 24-byte number, used only once with any given session key. It does not need to be secret or random, but it does have to be unique. Never use the same nonce twice with the same key. This would basically reveal the affected messages and leave you vulnerable to forgeries. The easiest (and recommended) way to generate this nonce is to select it at random. See intro(3monocypher) about random number generation (use your operating system's random number generator).

  Note: `crypto_aead_init_djb`() and `crypto_aead_init_ietf`() use shorter nonces (8 and 12 bytes respectively), which cannot be selected at random without risking a catastrophic reuse. For those shorter nonces, use a counter instead.

mac
  A 16-byte message authentication code (MAC) that can only be produced by someone who knows the session key. This guarantee cannot be upheld if a nonce has been reused with the session key because doing so allows the attacker to learn the authentication key associated with that nonce. The MAC is intended to be sent along with the ciphertext.
ad
  Additional data to authenticate. It will not be encrypted. This is used to authenticate relevant data that cannot be encrypted. May be `NULL` if ad_size is zero.
ad_size
  Length of the additional data, in bytes.
plain_text
  The secret message. Its contents will be kept hidden from attackers. Its length, however, will not. Be careful when combining encryption with compression. See intro(3monocypher) for details.
cipher_text
  The encrypted message.
text_size
  Length of both plain_text and cipher_text, in bytes. Virtually unlimited, except when `crypto_aead_init_ietf`() is used, in which case it must never exceed 2^38 - 64.

The cipher_text and plain_text arguments may point to the same buffer for in-place encryption. Otherwise, the buffers they point to must not overlap.

`crypto_aead_unlock`() first checks the integrity of an encrypted message. If it has been corrupted, `crypto_aead_unlock`() does nothing and returns -1 immediately. Otherwise it decrypts the message then returns zero. Always check the return value.

## Incremental interface

For long messages that may not fit in memory, first initialise a context with `crypto_aead_init_x`(), then encrypt each chunk with `crypto_aead_write`(). The receiving end will initialise its own context with `crypto_aead_init_x`(), then decrypt each chunk with `crypto_aead_read`().

Just like `crypto_aead_unlock`(), `crypto_aead_read`() first checks the integrity of the encrypted chunk, then returns -1 immediately if it has been corrupted. Otherwise it decrypts the chunk then returns zero. Always check the return value.

The encryption key is changed between each chunk, providing a symmetric ratchet that enforces the order of the messages. Attackers cannot reorder chunks without `crypto_aead_read`() noticing. Truncation however is not detected. You must detect the last chunk manually. Possible methods include using ad to mark the last chunk differently, prefixing all plaintext messages with a marking byte (and use a different marking byte for the last chunk), or sending the total message size up front and encode the remaining size in ad. Once the last chunk is sent or received, wipe the context with crypto_wipe(3monocypher).

`crypto_aead_init_djb`() and `crypto_aead_init_ietf`() are variants of `crypto_aead_init_x`() with a shorter nonce. Those nonces are too short to be selected at random. Use a counter instead.

In addition to its short nonce, `crypto_aead_init_ietf`() has a smaller internal counter that limits the size of chunks to 256GiB. Exceeding this size leaks the contents of the chunk. It is provided strictly for compatibility with RFC 8439.

# RETURN VALUES

`crypto_aead_lock`(), `crypto_aead_init_x`(), `crypto_aead_init_djb`(), `crypto_aead_init_ietf`(), and `crypto_aead_write`() return nothing. `crypto_aead_unlock`() and `crypto_aead_read`() return 0 on success or -1 if the message was corrupted (i.e. mac mismatched the combination of key, nonce, ad, and cipher_text). Corruption can be caused by transmission errors, programmer error, or an attacker's interference. plain_text does not need to be wiped if the decryption fails.

# EXAMPLES

The following examples assume the existence of `arc4random_buf`(), which fills the given buffer with cryptographically secure random bytes. If `arc4random_buf`() does not exist on your system, see intro(3monocypher) for advice about how to generate cryptographically secure random bytes.

Encryption:

    uint8_t key        [32];    /* Random, secret session key  */
    uint8_t nonce      [24];    /* Use only once per key       */
    uint8_t plain_text [12] = "Lorem ipsum"; /* Secret message */
    uint8_t mac        [16];    /* Message authentication code */
    uint8_t cipher_text[12];              /* Encrypted message */
    arc4random_buf(key,   32);
    arc4random_buf(nonce, 24);
    crypto_aead_lock(cipher_text, mac,
                     key, nonce,
                     NULL, 0,
                     plain_text, sizeof(plain_text));
    /* Wipe secrets if they are no longer needed */
    crypto_wipe(plain_text, 12);
    crypto_wipe(key, 32);
    /* Transmit cipher_text, nonce, and mac over the network,
     * store them in a file, etc.
     */

To decrypt the above:

    uint8_t       key        [32]; /* Same as the above        */
    uint8_t       nonce      [24]; /* Same as the above        */
    const uint8_t cipher_text[12]; /* Encrypted message        */
    const uint8_t mac        [16]; /* Received along with text */
    uint8_t       plain_text [12]; /* Secret message           */
    if (crypto_aead_unlock(plain_text, mac,
                           key, nonce,
                           NULL, 0,
                           cipher_text, sizeof(plain_text))) {
        /* The message is corrupted.
         * Wipe key if it is no longer needed,
         * and abort the decryption.
         */
        crypto_wipe(key, 32);
    } else {
        /* ...do something with the decrypted text here... */
        /* Finally, wipe secrets if they are no longer needed */
        crypto_wipe(plain_text, 12);
        crypto_wipe(key, 32);
    }

In-place encryption:

    uint8_t key  [32];    /* Random, secret session key  */
    uint8_t nonce[24];    /* Use only once per key       */
    uint8_t text [12] = "Lorem ipsum"; /* Secret message */
    uint8_t mac  [16];    /* Message authentication code */
    arc4random_buf(key,   32);
    arc4random_buf(nonce, 24);
    crypto_aead_lock(text, mac,
                     key, nonce,
                     NULL, 0,
                     text, sizeof(text));
    /* Wipe secrets if they are no longer needed */
    crypto_wipe(key, 32);
    /* Transmit cipher_text, nonce, and mac over the network,
     * store them in a file, etc.
     */

In-place decryption:

    uint8_t        key  [32]; /* Same as the above             */
    const uint8_t  nonce[24]; /* Same as the above             */
    const uint8_t  mac  [16]; /* Received from along with text */
    uint8_t        text [12]; /* Message to decrypt            */
    if (crypto_aead_unlock(text, mac, key, nonce,
                           NULL, 0,
                           text, sizeof(text))) {
    	/* The message is corrupted.
    	 * Wipe key if it is no longer needed,
    	 * and abort the decryption.
    	 */
    	crypto_wipe(key, 32);
    } else {
    	/* ...do something with the decrypted text here... */
    	/* Finally, wipe secrets if they are no longer needed */
    	crypto_wipe(text, 12);
    	crypto_wipe(key, 32);
    }

Encrypt one message with the incremental interface:

    uint8_t key        [32];    /* Random, secret session key  */
    uint8_t nonce      [24];    /* Use only once per key       */
    uint8_t plain_text [12] = "Lorem ipsum"; /* Secret message */
    uint8_t mac        [16];    /* Message authentication code */
    uint8_t cipher_text[12];              /* Encrypted message */
    arc4random_buf(key,   32);
    arc4random_buf(nonce, 24);
    crypto_aead_ctx ctx;
    crypto_aead_init_x(&ctx, key, nonce);
    crypto_aead_write(&ctx, cipher_text, mac,
                      NULL, 0,
                      plain_text, sizeof(plain_text));
    /* Wipe secrets if they are no longer needed */
    crypto_wipe(plain_text, 12);
    crypto_wipe(key, 32);
    crypto_wipe(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
    /* Transmit cipher_text, nonce, and mac over the network,
     * store them in a file, etc.
     */

To decrypt the above:

    uint8_t       key        [32]; /* Same as the above        */
    uint8_t       nonce      [24]; /* Same as the above        */
    const uint8_t cipher_text[12]; /* Encrypted message        */
    const uint8_t mac        [16]; /* Received along with text */
    uint8_t       plain_text [12]; /* Secret message           */
    crypto_aead_ctx ctx;
    crypto_aead_init_x(&ctx, key, nonce);
    if (crypto_aead_read(&ctx, plain_text, mac,
                         NULL, 0,
                         cipher_text, sizeof(plain_text))) {
    	/* The message is corrupted.
    	 * Wipe key if it is no longer needed,
    	 * and abort the decryption.
    	 */
    	crypto_wipe(key, 32);
    	crypto_wipe(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
    } else {
    	/* ...do something with the decrypted text here... */
    	/* Finally, wipe secrets if they are no longer needed */
    	crypto_wipe(plain_text, 12);
    	crypto_wipe(key, 32);
    	crypto_wipe(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
    }

# SEE ALSO

crypto_x25519(3monocypher), crypto_wipe(3monocypher), intro(3monocypher)

# STANDARDS

These functions implement RFC 8439. `crypto_aead_lock`() and `crypto_aead_init_x`(), use XChaCha20 instead of ChaCha20. `crypto_aead_init_djb`() uses a 64-bit nonce and a 64-bit counter. `crypto_aead_init_ietf`() is fully compatible with the RFC. Note that XChaCha20 derives from ChaCha20 the same way XSalsa20 derives from Salsa20 and benefits from the same security reduction (proven secure as long as ChaCha20 itself is secure).

`crypto_aead_read`() and `crypto_aead_write`() preserve the nonce and counter defined in `crypto_aead_init_x`(), `crypto_aead_init_djb`(), or `crypto_aead_init_ietf`(), and instead change the session key. The new session key is made from bytes [32..63] of the ChaCha20 stream used to generate the authentication key and encrypt the message. (Recall that bytes [0..31] are the authentication key, and bytes [64..] are used to encrypt the message.)

# HISTORY

The `crypto_lock`() and `crypto_unlock`() functions first appeared in Monocypher 0.1. `crypto_lock_aead`() and `crypto_unlock_aead`() were introduced in Monocypher 1.1.0. In Monocypher 2.0.0, the underlying algorithms for these functions were changed from a custom XChaCha20/Poly1305 construction to an implementation of RFC 7539 (now RFC 8439) with XChaCha20 instead of ChaCha20. The `crypto_lock_encrypt`() and `crypto_lock_auth`() functions were removed in Monocypher 2.0.0. In Monocypher 4.0.0, the `crypto_lock`() and `crypto_unlock`() were removed, Functions were renamed and arguments reordered for consistency, and the incremental interface was added.

# CAVEATS

Monocypher does not perform any input validation. Any deviation from the specified input and output length ranges results in undefined behaviour. Make sure your inputs are correct.

March 6, 2023 | Debian